What does it take for a positive epistemic status to obtain? I argue throughout my thesis that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Instead, if for example a belief is justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. A fundamental topic in epistemology is the question of what sorts of factors can be relevant to determining the positive epistemic status of belief. Epistemic Internalism holds that these factors must be “internal” (in (...) a sense that needs to be specified). Epistemic Externalism is the denial of internalism. My thesis is an explanation and defense of an internalist theory of epistemic justification. -/- The central claim of my thesis is that something is “internal” in this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object of the agent’s conscious awareness. By considering key cases, I show that without an awareness requirement on justification, the subject cannot avoid what I call the Subject’s Perspective Objection. In developing this objection I examine and respond to an argument against the awareness requirement which claims that such awareness either leads to a vicious regress of requiring higher order beliefs of increasing complexity (if any beliefs are to be justified), or else requiring such awareness is unmotivated. This regress is generated because it is assumed that the relevant kind of awareness must be doxastic. My solution invokes what I call ‘strong non-doxastic awareness’ that grounds non-inferential justification and thereby avoids this dilemma, while meeting the Subject’s Perspective Objection. -/- I also argue that external factors, such as the reliability (actual or conditional) of the mechanism supporting the belief, are not necessary for justification. I argue for this conclusion by comparing what constitutes justified belief in the actual world with one’s counterpart in a ‘demon world’. I argue that this intuition, correctly interpreted, counts in favour of internalism. As I explain, many philosophers moved by arguments presented by externalists about mental content deny that such a case is possible. In opposition I argue that the awareness requirement remains substantially unaffected, no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key is that the two worlds are completely subjectively indistinguishable from each other for those who inhabit them in all the ways of which they are consciously aware. -/- If neither the obtaining of truth nor reliability is necessary for epistemic justification, what makes justification genuinely epistemic? In the final chapter I argue against recent work that assimilates justification with knowledge, as well as for a positive account of the truth connection. As to the former question, I defend the orthodoxy that they are distinct epistemic statuses; as to the latter, I argue that the connection between justification and truth is conceptual. That is, epistemic justification is epistemic because it turns on evidence; evidence is epistemic because it is conceptually linked with truth. Epistemic justification, therefore, is conceptually linked with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it distinctively epistemic. -/- In short, this thesis is an explanation and defense of an internalist theory of epistemic justification. The central claim of the thesis is that something is “internal” in this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object of the agent’s conscious awareness. I argue that conscious awareness is a necessary condition of epistemic justification obtaining, and that factors external to consciousness play no justificatory role. (shrink)

The paper begins by considering David Armstrong's beautiful paper 'The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism', which conjectures how we get the illusion that there are non-physical qualia. There are discussions of other metaphysical illusions, that there is a passage of time, that we have libertarian free will, and that consciousness is ineffable (which last also relates to Armstrong), and of their possible explanations. Moral: avoid appeal to so called intuition or phenomenology.

Basic disagreements about what makes human life valuable hinder use of the concept of futility to decide whether it is appropriate to continue life support for one in a permanent state of unconsciousness, or to provide intensive medical care to one in the last stages of a terminal illness (the “paradigm cases”). Triage planning (the process of establishing criteria for health care prioritization) is an attractive alternative framework for addressing the paradigm cases. Triage planning permits society to see the cases (...) in the context of diverse moral perspectives, limited resources, and competing health care demands. Furthermore, at least one essential question posed by the paradigm cases is whether treatment is wasteful, and triage planning is a useful model for identifying and eliminating wasteful medical care. The authors describe how triage planning can be implemented to address the paradigm cases, and conclude that it offers one way of moving debate about these cases beyond futility. (shrink)

Hobbes’ account of these issues is conspicuously brief and puzzling. Indeed it has been criticized by some commentators as ‘confused.’ I hope to show, however, that it appears confused only because it has not been read with sufficient precision. Properly understood, Hobbes’ account is both exact and profound. It is also, in my view, far more interesting as a conception of natural right than the modern ‘confusions’ which have come to be read into it.To show this, the text must be (...) read as it is presented: on its own terms, analytically and exactly. In what follows, therefore, I shall focus upon Hobbes’ definitive account of the right of nature in chapter XIV of Leviathan, with only minimal reference to other passages and other works. I do not pretend that this is the only possible approach to Hobbes on this point; but it does show how his account may be read intelligibly, and with greater respect for the power and precision of his thought. (shrink)

Some years ago, Lokhorst proposed an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally's deontic logic. This reformulation was unsatisfactory, because it provided a striking theorem that Mally himself did not mention. In this paper, we present an alternative reformulation of Mally's deontic logic that does not provide this theorem.

In an increasingly global landscape, NFP initiatives including those addressing animal protection, are increasingly operating cross-borders. Doing so without respect, local engagement, and a thorough understanding of the issues of concern is fraught with danger, and potentially wasteful of resources. To this purpose, we sought to understand attitudes to the importance of 13 major world social issues in relation to animal protection by surveying 3433 students from at least 103 universities across 12 nations. The emergence of a ‘nature trifecta’ was (...) suggested, with animal and environmental protection and sustainable development recurring as the most highly rated in importance across all countries, with these issues also consistently rating amongst the highest in each individual country. It is concluded that significant differences exist between attributed importance of world issues by nation, pointing towards the benefit of tailoring NFP initiatives by country and region. It is also suggested that nation, or more specifically, sociopolitical and cultural region, is a vitally important demographic for consideration in social development. (shrink)

In this article, I present a critical literature study of the theoretical approach of practical theologians in South Africa to our discipline, in honour of Yolanda Dreyer on her 60th birthday. Some of my colleagues' approaches at the universities of Stellenbosch, Free State, Pretoria, Unisa and NWU are discussed. All of them work with practical theological hermeneutics. The basic hermeneutic approach of Daniël Louw is widened with an integrated approach by Richard R. Osmer in which practical theology as a hermeneutic (...) discipline also includes the empirical aspect which the action theory approach has contributed to the discussion. After discussing Louw's basic hermeneutic approach, all the other colleagues who basically accepted Osmer's approach in their publications are discussed. Important and new ground is being broken by contemporary colleagues, including research in public practical theology, without neglecting the focus on Christian congregations, and new work is being done at the grass roots level of African issues in our country. (shrink)

The influence of sediment oxygen heterogeneity, due to bioturbation, on diffusive oxygen flux was investigated. Laboratory experiments were carried out with 3 macrobenthic species presenting different bioturbation behaviour patterns: the polychaetes Nereis diversicolor and Nereis virens, both constructing ventilated galleries in the sediment column, and the gastropod Cyclope neritea, a burrowing species which does not build any structure. Oxygen two-dimensional distribution in sediments was quantified by means of the optical planar optode technique. Diffusive oxygen fluxes and a variability index were (...) calculated on the captured oxygen images. All species increased sediment oxygen heterogeneity compared to the controls without animals. This was particularly noticeable with the polychaetes because of the construction of more or less complex burrows. Integrated diffusive oxygen flux increased with oxygen heterogeneity due to the production of interface available for solute exchanges between overlying water and sediments. This work shows that sediment heterogeneity is an important feature of the control of oxygen exchanges at the sediment–water interface. (shrink)